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ABSTRACT 
Understanding human-system response is critical to being able to plan and predict mission success in the 
modern battlespace.  Commonly, human reliability analysis has been used to predict failures of human 
performance in complex, critical systems.  However, most human reliability methods fail to take culture 
into account.  This paper takes an easily understood state of the art human reliability analysis method and 
extends that method to account for the influence of culture, including acceptance of new technology, upon 
performance.  The cultural parameters used to modify the human reliability analysis were determined from 
two standard industry approaches to cultural assessment:  Hofstede’s (1991) cultural factors and Davis’ 
(1989) technology acceptance model (TAM).  The result is called the Culture Adjustment Method (CAM).  
An example is presented that (1) reviews human reliability assessment with and without cultural attributes 
for a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system attack, (2) demonstrates how country 
specific information can be used to increase the realism of HRA modeling, and (3) discusses the differences 
in human error probability estimates arising from cultural differences.   
Keywords: Culture, human reliability analysis, behavior prediction, culture adjustment method 
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INTRODUCTION
Arguably, the best approach for meeting military 
objectives is to create an integrated strategy. Due 
to limitations in human factors technology, 
military planners trying to meet objectives to 
deny, degrade, destroy, disrupt, or otherwise 
influence opponents have been forced to treat 
human-system interaction primarily in a 
qualitative fashion.  This is not to say that 
logistics, force ratios and equipment 
survivability have not been treated in a 
quantitative fashion.  Rather, the need for the 
human to detect, diagnosis, predict, and mitigate
hostile actions has not been treated in a 
systematic, quantitative fashion.  One approach 
to remedy this situation is to apply quantitative 
modeling methods. Quantitative modeling is 
used to interpret and understand sequential 
events, and predict and calculate the effects of 
multiple interactions of human and machines 
across all levels of a system.  In part, the current 
lack of quantification in many approaches to 
assessing human performance is a result of the 
lack of underlying data and constrained 
availability of tools to assess differences in 
performance. Further, what does exist is not 
sensitive to important performance distinctions 
that are a function of culture and organization. 
Culture is a universal phenomenon influencing 
human performance from country to country.  
Culture influences not only how we perceive the 
actions of others, but also our response to events.  
Therefore, when the analyst assesses the 
behavior of people in a complex, critical system, 
culture must be accounted for just as internal 
psychological factors, such as fatigue, workload, 
and fitness for duty are accounted.  
Recent work at the Idaho National Laboratory 
(INL) provides a unique approach for 
quantifying human-system interaction and the 
effect of culture for select scenarios.  The model 
discussed in this article employs probabilistic 
risk assessment (PRA) and human reliability 
analysis (HRA) methods to review potential 
mission success and failures.  HRA typically 
estimates the probability of erroneous (and 
conversely successful) human action as a 
function of the task modified by contextual 
influences called performance shaping factors 
(PSFs).  PSFs are elements of the workers’ 
internal and external environment that affect 
their cognition; they may include workload, 
stress, fatigue, training, and fitness for duty.  
In previous work, it became apparent that the 
ability to extrapolate human error probability 
estimates derived by standard HRA methods to 
other cultures was limited.  Cultural differences 
limit extrapolation of HRA methods to situations 
of interest around the world because culture 
impacts how tasks are designed and performed, 
as well as influences people’s motivation to act.  
Furthermore, culture combines with situational 
aspects to affect human decision-making and 
actions.  HRA methods are limited because most 
data used in HRA was derived from behaviors 
studies performed in the U.S. on Americans. 
Culture, for the purposes of this paper, is defined 
as the shaping of behavior and expectations that 
distinguishes the members of one group or 
category of people from those of another.  It can 
be expressed as a collection of values, norms, 
traditions, attitudes, beliefs, and institutions that 
characterize a group [1, 2, 3]. Culture, which 
includes safety culture and organizational 
factors, has been shown to significantly affect 
performance of personnel in many industries. 
For example, recent events at the Davis Besse 
nuclear plant indicate that reactor vessel head 
corrosion was as much due to cultural factors 
and work process factors as to technical 
challenges.[4] Culture influences the probability 
of a person following a specific course of action 
and thus may affect the probability of actions.  
Incorporating cultural influences into 
quantitative, predictive models of human 
decisions and actions in large complex system 
operations provides insights into weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities of human performance.  However, 
the representation and quantification of culture 
Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) 2006 
2006 Paper No. 2897 
remains a challenge for analysts.  
Evidence of Cultural Influences on Human 
Performance 
Human-system performance varies widely for 
identical equipment because of cultural 
influences on perception and work processes.  
We can see this when the safety and performance 
records for the same aircraft vary dramatically, 
even when flight profiles and environmental 
factors are taken into account. On a macro level, 
organizational factors and workplace safety 
culture influence performance. Thus, chemical 
plants designed and built by the same vendor 
have different performance.  On a micro level, 
psychological studies indicate differences in 
perception and attribution of cause occur as a 
function of experience and culture. 
Safety culture of an organization has been 
extensively studied in the U.S. and abroad and is 
known to strongly influence how work is 
performed.  Safety culture encompasses a broad 
spectrum of characteristics, such as personnel 
attitudes, the control of work activities, and 
organizational structures. Safety is affected by 
how information is communicated and by how 
peers and supervisors interact. There is evidence 
that safety attitudes and safety performance are 
positively correlated [5, 6].  
Although safety culture is only a subset of work 
culture, it highlights the potential influence of 
culture upon human performance and human 
systems response. Events at the Tokai Mura 
Facility in Japan underscore how human factors, 
management and organization, safety culture and 
aspects of culture can combine to influence 
accidents and compromise human response [7, 
8]. The Tokai Mura Facility is a uranium 
reprocessing facility that JCO operated under 
license agreement with Japanese authorities.  At 
this facility, double batching and failure to use 
criticality safe geometry led to the deaths of two 
workers, yielding the worst accident in the 
history of the Japanese nuclear industry.  A key 
contributor to this event was erosion of the safety 
culture and safety standards in deference to 
production.  
From this event a number of cultural influence 
points can be determined. Miscommunication 
played a key role in this event: a staff member 
from the fuels division who consulted with the 
crew performing the ill-fated campaign 
misunderstood the enrichment concentrations 
being used and helped support actions leading to 
the criticality. The miscommunication may have 
arisen from cultural norms that prescribe 
interactions between people, due to the 
hierarchical nature of the culture.  Lower ranked 
workers may have been unlikely to challenge 
direction from the safety review group or the 
advice of the fuels department staff engineer.  
Also there seemed to have been an unwarranted 
sense of safety by the crew.  They mistakenly 
believed that the technology present in the room 
were inherently safe and would preclude them 
from injury.  
Examples of culture effects on human 
performance are found in the work of Nisbett [9], 
who demonstrated that East Asians and 
Americans responded in qualitatively different 
ways to the same information.  In one 
experiment designed to test differences in 
attention to aspects of an image between East 
Asians and Westerners, Nisbett found that 
Japanese attend to the entirety of an image while 
American are more likely to focus on a particular 
object within the image.  This difference in focus 
implies that these groups could respond 
differently to information when faced with 
complex human-machine interfaces.  
Sanchez-Burks, Nisbett, and Ybarra [10] found 
that Latin Americans focus on socio-emotional 
considerations resulted in a relatively greater 
preference for workgroups with a strong 
interpersonal orientation.  Preferred 
communication style had a far greater impact on 
preferences for workgroups and judgments about 
their likely success than did the ethnic 
composition of the workgroups.  Since 
communication pathways are known to affect 
group performance [4], these groups may have 
different rates of success and failure using the 
same communication system.  In still another 
study, Nisbett and colleagues [Ibid] found that 
when making predictions about how people 
could be expected to behave, Koreans were 
much more likely than Americans to cite 
situational factors than personality characteristics 
as reasons for someone's behavior, implying that 
a worker’s poor fitness for duty may be ignored 
longer by Koreans than Americans. 
In another experiment, Peng and Nisbett [11] 
argued that the Chinese manner of dealing with 
contradictions result in compromise, wherein 
both parties retain elements of their opposing 
Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) 2006 
2006 Paper No. 2897 
perspectives by seeking a “middle way.” 
European-American ways result in a 
differentiation model that polarizes contradictory 
perspectives in an effort to determine which is 
‘correct’.  They found that Americans respond to 
contradiction by polarizing their beliefs whereas 
Chinese respond by moderating their beliefs.  
This tendency to moderate beliefs could have a 
strong impact on performance when workers 
have differing opinions regarding the correct 
course of action in a complex situation.  A 
worker who disagreed with the course of action 
might not suggest what could potentially be a 
better alternative. 
Cultural Factors 
In this paper we seek to improve HRA 
characterization of human performance by 
broadening the scope of HRA analysis from the 
traditional, universal set of PSFs to include 
culture factors. A model of culture and one of 
technology acceptance are combined with a 
standard human reliability method: Hofstede’s 
cultural assessment method [1, 2], the 
technology acceptance method developed by 
Davis [12, 13, 14], and SPAR-H [5] by Gertman 
et al.  These approaches complement each other 
and provide a comprehensive assessment of 
culture.  Where Hofstede's model reviews culture 
from a national and organizational perspective, 
Davis relates culture to the assimilation of 
technology within an organization.  The 
integration of these two approaches provides the 
basis for the Culture Adjustment Method 
(CAM).  Hofstede's approach is described first 
and then Davis's method is reviewed. Next, these 
models are combined with the SPAR-H HRA 
method to improve estimation of human error 
probability. 
Hofstede's Approach 
Hofstede conducted perhaps the most 
comprehensive study of how culture affects the 
workplace. From 1967 to 1973 while working at 
International Business Machines (IBM), he 
collected and analyzed data from over 100,000 
individuals from 50 countries.  Subsequent 
studies validating the results have included 
commercial airline pilots and students in 23 
countries, civil service managers in 14 counties, 
‘up-market’ consumers in 15 countries and 
‘elites’ in 19 countries. Hofstede identified four 
primary dimensions to differentiate cultures: 
Power Distance (PDI); 
Individualism/Collectivism (IDV); Masculinity 
(MAS); and Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI).   
Power distance indicates how a culture 
distributes authority (e.g., tall or shallow 
hierarchies).  High power distance yields a strict 
hierarchy of relations between people such as the 
relationship between average workers and 
managers.  Subordinates may never be consulted 
for opinions or ideas in high power distance 
cultures.  
Uncertainty avoidance measures if a culture 
tolerates situations without well-defined rules. 
Uncertainty avoidant cultures do not highly 
tolerate ambiguity.  High uncertainty avoidant 
cultures often have strict ‘rules of etiquette’ that 
define behavior even in very uncommon 
situations.  In these cultures you may see deeply 
ingrained rules of etiquette and conduct between 
people, preferences for tasks with sure outcomes, 
and a desire to follow instructions. 
Unsurprisingly, members of uncertainty avoidant 
cultures are less likely to deviate from rules or 
procedures.  Uncertainty tolerant cultures may 
expect or even encourage members to 
extemporize in unusual situations.  
Individualistic groups tend to reinforce 
individual achievement, while collectivist groups 
reinforce achievement of the group.  Collectivist 
societies are often characterized by close ties 
between group members, such as families or 
work groups.  These cultures reinforce extended 
families; everyone takes responsibility for fellow 
members of their group.  
Masculine cultures reinforce and attach 
importance to individual achievement, control, 
and power. A high Masculinity ranking indicates 
the country experiences a high degree of gender 
role differentiation. A Low Masculinity ranking 
indicates the country has a low level of 
differentiation and discrimination between 
genders. Low Masculinity cultures tend to 
emphasize the socio-emotional aspects of 
working together.  These include the importance 
of within group communication, emphasis on 
family, and individual identities coming not so 
much from work roles but rather from personal 
attributes and roles outside of the workplace 
(e.g., parent, musician, athlete). 
Caveats to Hofstede’s Measures 
Hofstede’s work generalized about the entire 
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national population in each country solely on the 
basis a few questionnaire responses. The 
respondents were employees in the subsidiaries 
of a single company, IBM, which had many 
nationally atypical characteristics. These 
included: the company’s selective recruitment 
only from the ‘middle classes’; frequent 
international training of employees; 
technologically advanced and unusual 
characteristics of its products during the survey 
periods; frequent contacts between subsidiary 
and international headquarters staff; its tight, 
internationally centralized control; U.S. 
ownership when foreign direct investment was 
new and controversial; and the comparatively 
young age of its managers. 
Davis:  Technology Acceptance 
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) 
developed by Davis and Bagozzi [12; 13; 14] 
relates perceived ease of use and perceived 
usefulness of technology and technological 
solutions to the user’s intention to use the 
technology.  Ease of use is the degree to which 
use of a technology is free from effort, and 
includes how transparent rules for use are to the 
user, how easily the system state is understood, 
ease of navigation or manipulation of data items, 
and whether the technology provides sufficient 
information to complete the task.  Perceived 
usefulness is the degree a user believes that the 
technology will improve his or her work 
performance beyond that of alternate methods.  It 
is influenced by the reliability of the software 
and the amount of trust between the user and the 
system. Davis's work has been replicated 
numerous times.  
Innovation, or the degree to which a technology 
affords the user additional or enhanced 
capabilities, also moderates technology 
acceptance.  Although a technology may be 
highly innovative, intended users may not accept 
it.  Tornatzky and Klien [16] found that 
compatibility, relative advantage, and 
complexity had the most significant relationships 
with technology adoption across a broad range of 
innovation types. 
HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS (HRA) 
HRA is used to estimate the probability of a 
system-required human action, task, or job being 
completed successfully within the mission time 
with no extraneous human actions detrimental to 
system performance. Results of HRAs are often 
used as inputs to PRA or event sequence 
diagrams (ESDs), which decompose the system 
into its constituent components, including 
hardware, software, and actions performed by 
human operators.  An overview of HRA and 
HRA methods can be found in Gertman and 
Blackman (1994). [17] 
The goals of HRA are to determine whether 
human errors will have serious consequences and 
to identify how likely these errors are to occur.  
Most, if not all HRA methods, do not consider 
the influence of culture upon human 
performance beyond safety culture.  Therefore it 
is an open challenge to integrate the factors 
identified by Hofstede and Davis into the HRA 
quantification process.  HRA methods may be 
either qualitative or quantitative.  Qualitative 
HRA methods identify decision points, failure 
mechanisms, and error pathways.  Once 
vulnerabilities are identified qualitatively, the 
results are used to inform analysts and support 
modeling in the form of ESDs and other systems 
analysis tools. 
Introduction to HRA Methods 
The HRA method used in the Culture 
Adjustment Method (CAM) is built on an 
explicit information-processing model of human 
performance derived from the behavioral 
sciences literature [4, 16, 5,17].  In traditional 
HRA, base human error probabilities are 
estimated and then modified by PSFs.  CAM 
identifies eight standard PSFs capable of 
influencing human performance; see Gertman et 
al. [5] for detailed information regarding these 
PSFs.   
Incorporation of Cultural Influence  
After research and review of cultural influences 
and the factors identified by Hofstede, Power 
Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance were 
selected as the two factors that account for the 
greatest variance in technology use across 
infrastructures.  Further, these factors appear to 
be the least subsumed by Hofstede’s other 
factors or by Davis’ TAM. 
Determine and Apply the Culture Modifier 
The analyst obtains an estimate of the effect of 
each of the three cultural factors identified by 
answering the questions provided in Tables II – 
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IV (below) regarding the group of interest.  
Tables II – IV include in parentheses answers 
used in the later example.  These questions were 
based upon questions used by Hofstede in his 
cultural assessments at IBM and on Davis’ 
questionnaires for TAM.  Answers to the 
questions lead to a high, moderate or low rating 
of the group on each of the three cultural 
characteristics.  Cultural scores are required on 
all three dimensions; the 27 possible 
combinations are listed in Table V, which 
includes the modifier for each factor 
combination. 
Table 1.  Eight ‘Traditional’ PSFs used in CAM and general description.
PSF Description 
Available 
Time
The amount of time that an operator or a crew has to diagnose and act upon an abnormal event.  
Barely adequate—less than 2/3 the nominal required time is available. 
Extra time—time available is one to two times greater than the nominal time required.   
Expansive time—time available greater than two times the nominal time required; there is an 
inordinate amount of time to diagnose the problem. 
Stress The level of undesirable conditions and circumstances that impede the operator from easily 
completing a task. 
Complexity How difficult the task is to perform in the context, considers both the task and the environment in 
which it is to be performed. 
Highly complex—very difficult to perform, high ambiguity in what needs to be diagnosed or 
executed.   
Moderately complex—somewhat difficult to perform, some ambiguity in what needs to be 
diagnosed or executed, perhaps with some concurrent diagnoses or actions. 
Nominal—not difficult to perform, little ambiguity. 
Obvious diagnosis—diagnosis greatly simplified.  Validating and/or convergent information 
available, such as additional sensory information including sounds or vibrations.   
Experience/
Training
Includes years of experience of the individual or crew, whether or not the operator/crew has been 
trained on the scenario, the amount of time passed since training, whether training occurred in-
house or if operators had to travel to another country to receive training, and the systems involved 
in the task and scenario. 
Low—Experience/training does not provide the level of knowledge required to adequately perform 
the required tasks; does not provide adequate practice in those tasks; or does not expose individuals 
to various abnormal conditions.  
Nominal—An adequate amount of instruction, individuals are proficient in day-to-day operations 
and have been exposed to abnormal conditions.  
High—extensive experience; demonstrated mastery.  
Procedures The existence and use of formal operating procedures for the tasks under consideration. 
Not available—the procedure needed for a particular task is not available.  
Incomplete—information is needed that is not contained in the procedure.  
Available, but poor—a procedure is available, but it contains wrong, inadequate, ambiguous, or 
other poor information.  
Nominal—procedures are available and enhance performance.  . 
Ergonomics Quality of equipment, displays and controls, workplace layout, quality of information available 
from instrumentation.  Includes the human-machine interface quality. 
Missing/Misleading—Required information is not available from any source or the information that 
is present is inaccurate. 
Poor—the design of the system negatively impacts task performance.  
Nominal—the design of the system supports correct performance, but does not enhance 
performance or make tasks easier to carry out than typically expected  
Good—the design of the system provides needed information and the ability to carry out tasks to 
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lessens the opportunities for error.  
Fitness for 
duty
The ability of the individual to physically and mentally perform the task at the time required. 
Unfit—the individual is unable to carry out the required tasks, due to illness or other physical or 
mental incapacitation.  
Degraded fitness—the individual is able to carry out the tasks, although performance is negatively 
affected, e.g., illness, fever, fatigue from long duty hours, or distraction, or inappropriate 
overconfidence in abilities.  
Nominal—no known performance degradation is observed, the individual or crew is able to carry 
out tasks.  
Work 
processes
Aspects of doing work, including inter-organizational, safety culture, work planning, 
communication, and management support and policies, and coordination, command, and control. 
Also includes management, organizational, or supervisory factors, such as shift turnover, or 
communication with maintenance crews and auxiliary operators. Does not include culture.  Three 
levels of work processes are identified: poor, nominal, and good. 
The culture modifier is used to update the HEP 
that already accounts for traditional PSFs 
influences for action or diagnosis.  For sake of 
simplicity and consistency, higher culture scores 
increase base failure rates. The range of effect 
for culture varies from 0.8 (positive cultural 
influence) to 5 (strongly negative cultural 
influence).  This range of values for culture is 
consistent with the range of effects associated 
with traditional PSF included in SPAR-H.  
However, the CAM modifiers are preliminary 
estimates based upon expert judgment. 
Table 2. Power Distance
1. Degree of inequality among people  
Low/little   High 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Salary range between the highest and lowest paid in 
organizations 
Small    Large 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Importance of social status symbols 
Small    Large 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Importance of equality before the law 
Low    High 
5 4 3 2 1 
5. Importance of loyalty to close groups (i.e., family and 
friends) 
Low    High 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Importance of good / agreeable interpersonal relationships 
Lesser    Higher 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Recognition of a right to privacy 
Low    High 
5 4 3 2 1 
8. Freedom of the press 
Low    High 
5 4 3 2 1 
9. Respect for individual freedom 
Low    High 
5 4 3 2 1 
10. Importance of consensus in society 
Lesser    Higher 
1 2 3 4 5 
Scoring:
10 – 23  Low 
24-37  Moderate 
38 – 50  High (41) 
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Table 3. Uncertainty Avoidance
1. Openness to change and innovation 
Low    High 
5 4 3 2 1 
2. Faith in young people 
Low    High 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Tolerance of differences (i.e., religious, political and 
ideological)
Low    High 
5 4 3 2 1 
4. Reliance on rules to govern behavior 
Low    High 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Degree to which uncertainty is accepted as a normal 
feature of life 
Low    High 
5 4 3 2 1 
6. Acceptability of displaying emotions 
Low    High 
1 2 3 4 5 
Scoring 
5 – 13  Low 
14 – 21  Moderate 
22-30  High     (25) 
Table 4.  Technology Acceptance 
1. What the use of the technology stands for is 
important to the operators.  
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
(SA)              (SD) 
2. Operators prefer use of the technology is because 
of the underlying organizational values. 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
(SA)             (SD) 
3. Operators like using the technology primarily 
based on the similarity of their values  and the 
organizational values underlying its use. 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
(SA)            (SD) 
4. Operators feel a sense of personal ownership about 
the use of the technology. 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
(SA)            (SD) 
5. Operators talk up the use of the technology to 
colleagues as a great asset.  
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
(SA)            (SD) 
6. Operators are proud of using the technology.  7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
(SA)            (SD) 
7. Operators’ private views about use of the 
technology are different than those they express 
publicly. 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
(SA)            (SD) 
8. Unless operators are rewarded for using the 
technology in some way, they see no reason to spend 
extra effort in using it. 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
(SA)           (SD) 
9. Operators must use the technology in order to get 
rewarded in their jobs. 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
(SA)           (SD) 
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10. How hard operators work on using the technology 
is directly linked to how much they are rewarded. 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
(SA)          (SD) 
Scoring 
10 – 30  Low 
31 – 50  Moderate (41) 
51-70 High      
51-71
Table 5.  Cultural Factors Rating and Modifier.
Power distance Uncertainty 
avoidance 
Technology 
acceptance
Modifier 
High Low Low 
High Low Moderate 
High Moderate Low 
Moderate Low Low 
5
High Low High 
Low Low Low 
High High Low 
High Moderate Moderate 
Moderate Low Moderate 
Moderate Moderate Low 
High Moderate High 
High High Moderate 
Moderate High Low 
Moderate Low High 
Low Moderate Low 
Low Low Moderate 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
2
High High High 
Low High Low 
Low Low High 
Moderate Moderate High 
Moderate High Moderate 
Low Moderate Moderate 
1
Low High Moderate 
Moderate High High 
Low Moderate High 
Low High High 
0.8 
CAM APPROACH 
The CAM approach ties together assumptions for 
human performance modeling, performance 
shaping factors assessment, cultural influence 
determination, and system response requirements 
and places them within the context of a 
probabilistic modeling framework. 
CAM Theoretical Basis 
The theory behind CAM is straightforward.  As 
in standard HRA, a base HEP is presented that 
represents a distribution of values describing a 
human action.  It is assumed that the base HEP 
mean for a specific human action is the most 
likely estimate of the population in question and 
that the most likely specific human action for 
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any culture can be derived from the base HEP 
distribution.  The base HEP is then influenced by 
a set of PSFs by multiplying the cumulative PSF 
modifiers by the base HEP mean and converting 
the result into a ratio of failures per demand.  
The values are used as input to a Bayesian 
update method that results in a posterior 
distribution that reflects the modifications of the 
PSF.  The resulting distribution reflects PSF 
impact to the base HEP.  This follows the logic 
that the PSFs act on the base HEP, are contained 
within the base HEP, and are independent. 
The concept of a weight of knowledge factor to 
aid in quantifying uncertainty is introduced here 
for the CAM approach. The weight of 
knowledge qualitatively describes the strength of 
information behind the cumulative PSFs.  It is 
measured as a weak, moderate, or strong data 
inference (w-weak, m-moderate, s-strong) on the 
PSF and is determined by the analyst. A weak 
weight of knowledge suggests that the expert 
opinion or data are weakly tied to the PSF 
cumulative factor. It implies that there is 
uncertain knowledge to support the modifier 
associated with a given PSF.  Similarly, a 
moderate or strong weight of knowledge 
suggests that there is sufficient evidence to 
support the attribution of the PSF.  
It is assumed that a Strong (s) Weight of 
Knowledge has 3x the level of knowledge of a 
Weak (w) Weight of Knowledge and a Moderate 
Weight of Knowledge is 2x the Weak (w) 
Weight of Knowledge for any given PSF. 
Therefore, the Weight of Knowledge qualifying 
factors results in:  (w) = a factor of 1; (m) = a 
factor of 2; and (s) = a factor of 3. These factors 
are based upon the concept of influence to the 
prior distribution and are the product of 
observation. If little information is known about 
the assignment of the PSF modifier to the base 
HEP then an assignment of a (w) to the 
cumulative PSF modifier will not modify the 
uncertainty of the prior substantially and will be 
at the same order of magnitude to the mean value 
in the base HEP.  This assumption places the 
burden of uncertainty about the mean on the 
prior distribution.  For example, if the mean is on 
the order of 1E-5 then this infers some 
information about the dataset and the number of 
samples or initial evidence applied for the base 
HEP dataset to estimate a mean of 1E-5.  This is 
demonstrated in the example below.   
Determining the Cultural PSF 
The analyst determines the PSF culture rating in 
the following manner:  Using the questionnaires 
in Tables II through IV, a gross score across for 
the 3 culture factors is determined.  Guidance is 
provided on taking the gross score and assigning 
either a low, medium or high range of influence. 
The basis for answering these culture questions 
is the analysts understanding, familiarity, and 
supporting information related to the scenario(s) 
under evaluation.  There are twenty- seven 
combinations (high/high/high, 
high/high/medium, etc) possible, shown in Table 
V. The complete CAM process is shown in 
Figure 1. 
Example 1 
Terrorists from a religious Middle Eastern 
country have attacked a more secular country on 
their northern border.  The attackers are trying to 
launch a denial of service (DOS) attack on one of 
the host country’s control centers for the Energy 
Management System (EMS) controlling 
transmission and distribution across the national 
electric grid.  They have done so at the end of 
swing shift. The terrorists are exploiting an 
internet connection from the host facility to an 
international vendor who has an on-site service 
contract with them.  The link to the vendor is 
suspended and the facility personnel will have to 
respond on their own.  In this scenario, the 
terrorist gains access to the internal EMS 
network which will permit a DOS attack against 
the host system.  Additionally the terrorist may 
be able to corrupt the system and cause an 
extended outage period, i.e., blackout.  The 
situation is compounded because the terrorists 
have exploited a vulnerability that has corrupted 
the system status information available to the 
host country operators.  The three HEPs being 
considered as part of hypothetical risk analysis 
for this exploit is the operators’ 1) failure to 
detect system anomalies and 2) failure to isolate 
the system and shut down and 3) failure to 
restore to a safe/known state. 
Assumptions
1) Modeling of the attacker is not part of 
this exercise, the attacker is assumed to 
have complete knowledge of the EMS, 
the vendor connection, and have infinite 
preparation time prior to the attack.  
Also, there is no advance warning that 
the attack might occur. 
2) The operators, dispatch, supervision, 
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and Information Technology (IT) at the 
host country facility have the following 
characteristics: 
a. Hierarchical culture; 
b. Higher level of training on 
computer systems, have home 
systems; 
c. Have procedures available to 
them that they have been 
trained on, they have moderate 
trust in these procedures; 
d. Current reliability of the 
equipment is perceived to be 
high; 
e. They trust their equipment and 
there is little reliance on face-
to-face communications; 
f. The culture supports 
uncertainty and ambiguity; 
g. Ergonomics are not thought to 
detract from the defender, i.e., 
host country operators’ 
response. 
        3)    Supervisors and management are not  
       as computer literate as the workers. 
HRA with cultural overlay 
Cultural values were determined from two 
sources:  Hofstede’s country-by-country 
evaluation [16] and analysts’ review of the 
scenario and personnel culture and 
experience factors presented in the section 
above served as a basis to respond to the 
cultural characteristic matrix questions (see 
Tables II-IV).  The conventional PSF assignment 
for each of the three HEPs is in Appendix A. 
The PSF assignment for the 3 HEPs was as 
follows:  
HEP1 (Detect System Anomalies) represents a 
strong cognitive demand and the base HEP is 
1.0E-2, training = .8, complexity = 2, fitness for 
duty = 2, stress = 2; the remaining PSFs are rated 
nominal. The cultural modifier was estimated at 
2. In the analysts’ judgment, the cumulative PSF 
applied to the base HEP has a strong Weight of 
Knowledge (s) associated with it. 
HEP2 (Isolate and Shutdown) is action oriented 
and the base HEP is 1.0E-3; complexity is =5, 
stress = 2, fitness for duty =2, training is = 2 
(loss of vendor link and complications have not 
been trained to) ergonomics and remainder of 
PSFs are nominal. PSFs were determined to have 
a rating of 2. The cumulative PSF has a moderate 
weight of knowledge (m) applied to it. 
HEP3, restore system to safe state is action 
oriented.  Stress is now nominal because of 
analyst assumptions that personnel have properly 
isolated systems, fitness for duty is not an issue 
because additional personnel or the next shift 
have been involved in assisting with the 
situation, training is nominal because restoration 
is trained to complexity is there because of 
communication and reporting requirements.  
Procedures and work practices are assumed to be 
nominal because of the relatively disciplined and 
educated work force.  The cumulative PSF has a 
strong weight of knowledge (s) applied to it. 
Note that for the 3 examples above, the Cultural 
PSF assignment for the 3 factors is determined to 
be High/High/Moderate meaning the PDI and 
UAI indices were judged to be high for this 
culture and Technology Acceptance was judged 
to be moderate. This culture rating is applied to 
all 3 HEPs in the current example.  It is possible 
that different culture ratings could exist for 
singular HEPs, such as when different work 
groups or organizations within the same scenario 
would be involved.  
The calculations for the 3 HEPs are presented 
below: 
(1) HEP1 Detect system anomalies calculation:
The base HEP is represented by a beta 
distribution, where the mean is μ =1.0 E-2, Į = 
.4966, ȕ = 49.16.   
HEPC = base HEP * (PSF1 (.8x) * PSF2
(2x) * PSF3 (2x) * PSF4 (2x) * PSFc
(2x)) (s) 
= 1.0E-2 * 12.8, = 12.8E-2 or 12.8 
failures/100 demands 
Since a strong weight of knowledge is associated 
with the cumulative PSF the final failure/demand 
ratio is 12.8/100 * 3/3 = 38.4/300.  The result is: 
HEPculture is represented by a beta 
distribution, where the mean is μ 
=6.42E-2, Į = 160.497, ȕ = 2339.16 and 
ı = 4.9E-3. 
(2) HEP2 Isolate and Shutdown calculation:The 
base HEP is represented by a beta distribution, 
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where the mean is μ =1.0 E-3, Į = .497, ȕ = 
499.2.   
HEPC = base HEP * (PSF1 (5x) * PSF2
(2x) * PSF3 (2x) * PSF4 (2x) * PSFc
(2x)) (m) 
= 1.0E-3 * 80, = 80E-3 or 80 
failures/1000 demands 
Since a moderate weight of knowledge is 
associated with the cumulative PSF the final 
failure/demand ratio is 80/1000 * 2/2 = 
160/2000.  The result is: 
HEPculture is represented by a beta 
distribution, where the mean is μ =1.1 E-1, Į
= 38.497, ȕ = 311.16 and ı = 1.67E-2. 
In HEP2, culture combined with complexity, 
stress, and deficiencies in fitness for duty and 
training lead to a higher failure rate.  The human 
action response is complicated by the stress of 
the situation, the complexity of competing or 
misleading systems feedback and insufficiencies 
in training (it is assumed that personnel did not 
receive training on the sequence and timing of 
failures present during the attack). Since the 
operator culture believes their computer-based 
systems to be moderately reliable, it takes them a 
while to realize that some systems must be over 
ridden. Again there are delays waiting for 
approval by superiors before action is taken, this 
reflects the cultural Power Distance norms for 
inequality among people and the importance of 
social status.  The culture is not open to truly 
assimilating innovation and change and thus, 
operators will not, unlike American operators, 
take the initiative to take innovative means to 
restore or isolate systems. 
(3) HEP3 Restore to Safe State calculation: 
The base HEP is represented by a beta 
distribution, where the mean is μ =1.0 E-3, Į
= .497, ȕ = 499.2.   
HEPC = base HEP * (* PSFc (2x)) (s) 
= 1.0E-3 * 2, = 2E-3 or 2 failures/1000 
demands 
Since a strong Weight of Knowledge is 
associated with the cumulative PSF the final 
failure/demand ratio is 2/1000 * 3/3 = 6/3000.  
The result is: 
HEPculture is represented by a beta 
distribution, where the mean is μ =1.86 E-3, 
Į = 6.497, ȕ = 3393.2 and ı = 7.28E-4 
In HEP3, culture contributes to increased failures 
for this phase of the loss of service scenario. 
Human performance requirements for restoring 
systems to a safe state occur in the latter stages 
of the scenario and PSFs normally considered in 
HRA are considered to be nominal. Isolation has 
been performed and some sense of control has 
been returned to the operators and work force.  
Positive restoration requires understanding of 
what went wrong and system status.  It requires a 
depth of knowledge of dependencies between 
systems. It may require sending linemen out to 
the field to correct problems.  Culture operates 
within this scenario to cause an increased failure 
rate in the following manner. In this particular 
culture, there is not a large incentive to 
investigate what went wrong.  Thus, an accurate 
understanding of root or proximate causes of 
system failure may not be obtained leading to 
increased errors in restoration.  A reluctance to 
take responsibility will delay or defer sending 
individuals out into the field, thus causing an 
error of omission. 
 Table 6. HEP with the influence of culture considered. 
-
Base HEP HEPPSF1-8 HEP Culture
Detect system anomalies 1.0E-2 5.58E-2 1.1E-1 
Isolate and Shutdown 1.0E-3 3.2E-2 6.4E-2 
Restore to safe state 1.0E-3 1.0E-3 1.86E-3 
The questionnaires in Tables 2-4 provide scoring 
mechanisms for the various culture inventory 
items.  The use of the cultural overlay suggests 
the failure rate for detecting system anomalies is 
greater when cultural assessment is applied to 
base HEPs that have been adjusted for the 
Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) 2006 
2006 Paper No. 2897 
traditional PSFs described earlier in this paper.  
The failure to isolate and shutdown is higher 
when the influence of culture is accounted for 
when determining the failure rate. The HEP 
associated with restoring systems to a safe state 
is also higher when culture is considered. This is 
because this hypothetical culture fails to reward 
individuals for taking initiative or for using 
technology to solve problems when other means 
are available.  Thus, we can expect personnel to 
take greater time to respond and have higher 
failure rates when correcting problems. From a 
planning perspective reducing alternative means 
of solving problems in this particular population 
can force personnel to use technology with 
which they are not comfortable and potentially 
make the cyber attack even more effective. 
Example 2 
The example below presents one of the ways that 
we are using the CAM method to modify 
estimations of system response that involve 
human interactions.  Unlike the previous 
example, wherein CAM was used to answer the 
question, “Will this system function as 
required?”  This example, shows how CAM may 
be used in a model to answer the question 
“Given an initiating event, when will the system 
be back to normal?”. 
INL has done extensive work analyzing 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities of complex 
systems focusing on system response to 
abnormal events and the associated duration for 
systems to return to a nominal functioning state 
after such an event.  The human element often 
plays an integral role in estimating the extent and 
duration of an abnormal event.   
Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) are often used 
in PRA to provide an overview of system safety 
barriers and establish the sequential logic for 
developing event trees and binning consequences 
for different initiating events.  Critical 
component response is not typically captured, 
but can be in the ESD framework. ESDs consist 
of an initiator and a set of sequential actions or 
decision blocks.  The result provides the analyst 
with sets of system response pathways 
prioritized by likelihood.  INL has enhanced 
standard ESDs to include the timing of an 
abnormal event to establish the probability the 
system is restored to a nominal state within a 
period of time. 
One of the important aspects uncovered from 
developing an ESD is the identification of 
influence points that are significant contributors 
to pathway probability.  These influence points 
can provide a more surgical approach to 
defending systems and minimizing event 
durations and consequences.  Figure 1 is a 
representative ESD for an INL SCADA 
controlled electrical power grid. 
Adjusting for cultural perspectives provides a 
more accurate estimate of system response.  
ESDs are a natural environment to apply and test 
CAM.  The probability graphs below the action 
blocks in Figure 1 show the likelihood that an 
action is completed within a period of time with 
the median value shown directly above the 
graph.  The timing probability curves for these 
events were based on procedures, historical logs, 
and discussions with system experts.   
This ESD presents system response logic for a 
loss of power event affecting several facilities.  
Although the timing of actions will be 
determined by environmental and cultural 
factors, the emphasis of this example is on the 
decision blocks.  Cultural dependencies may 
modify the probabilities of decisions, thus 
directing the event down certain pathways. 
For purposes of discussions we have chosen the 
decision block where linemen decide to first 
check the substation versus a particular facility.  
In this hypothetical example, three cultures have 
been analyzed.  The probability for each is as 
follows.  The probability for INL SCADA 
linemen is p = 0.7, that is, there is a 70% chance 
that they will check the substation first.  There is 
a complementary probability of 30% that they 
will go directly to a facility that has reported an 
outage to investigate.  The cultural influence is 
from a number of factors; their trust that the 
SCADA is providing dependable information; 
their assessment of the distance and travel time 
to the substation versus the distance and travel 
time to the facility, the perceived importance of 
the facility, deference to what their supervisor 
would have them do, their tendency to think and 
act independently, and their understanding of and 
respect for procedures
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Figure 1. Event Sequence Diagram for INL SCADA response 
Culture #2 is evaluated on the same factors, but 
have procedures in place that make them slightly 
more disposed to check the facility first. There is 
a 60% chance for linemen from culture #2 to 
check the substation first. For the third culture, 
their trust in SCADA when directing them to the 
substation is not strong, the status of the facility 
manager is relatively high, and their procedures 
are vague.  Thus, culture #3 is less likely than the 
INL culture or culture #2 to go to the substation 
first to verify breaker conditions and take action. 
There is a 45% chance that linemen from culture 
#3 will go to the substation prior to the facility. 
In a full-blown example, the analyst would apply 
the CAM method shown in the previous sections 
to determine weights that modify the baseline 
probabilities
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Figure 2: An Example of CAM Application for Event Sequence Diagrams 
CONCLUSIONS 
Incorporation of the CAM approach to cultural 
factors into the SPAR-H HRA method gives 
analysts new insights into potential sources of 
error to more accurately represent critical 
situations.  These sources of error may not 
immediately be apparent when only viewed from 
the perspective of performance by U.S. 
operators.  In addition, the basic HRA method 
presented in this paper has been vetted for 
predicting human performance; its extension to 
include cultural factors has been consistently 
applied. However, the CAM method needs 
validation. 
Aside from the insights gained from modeling 
human response including understanding and 
predicting the immediate consequence(s) of 
human error, changes in the enemies’ time to 
respond that are due to cultural factors can 
provide information useful to the combatant 
commander’s planning process.  The CAM has 
not been applied to performance times.  
However, the cultural composite matrix and 
analysis presented above can be extrapolated 
from human error probability to include duration 
metrics.  This could be done by assessing the 
base time required in minutes for similar 
facilities in the U.S. and using the cultural score 
to compute the increase or decrease in expected 
response time. This can be performed for each 
sub event modeled and quantified in the event 
sequence diagram or fault tree. The multipliers 
for this application will be derived and validated 
in future work. 
Future work will be performed in four areas:  1) 
No
P =0.3 INL culture  
P =0.4 culture #2 
P =0.6 culture #3 
Yes
P =0.7 INL culture  
P =0.6 culture #2 
P =0.4 culture #3 
Do the Linemen check 
substation first? 
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to assess the relative effect and independence of 
the proposed cultural factors presented here; 2) 
to extend the capability of CAM to include 
expected changes in “time to perform” as a 
function of culture; 3) to provide guidance to the 
analyst regarding the determination of weights 
associated with importance and degree of 
knowledge; and 4) to assess the extent to which 
CAM can be applied in other scenarios involving 
critical infrastructure protection (CIP). These 
future efforts should be supported through the 
use of focused studies that can be used to 
validate the values, i.e., relative range of effect, 
used in CAM. In the absence of an empirically-
based data set, simulation methods in 
conjunction with structured expert estimation 
may be a logical and desirable near term 
alternative.  
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DISCLAIMER 
This information was prepared as an account of 
work sponsored by an agency of the U.S. 
Government.  Neither the U.S. Government nor 
any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, 
makes any warranty, express or implied, or 
assumes any legal liability or responsibility for 
the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any 
information, apparatus, product, or process 
disclosed, or represents that its use would not 
infringe privately owned rights.  References 
herein to any specific commercial product, 
process, or service by trade name, trademark, 
manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily 
constitute or imply its endorsement, 
recommendation, or favoring by the U.S. 
Government or any agency thereof.  The views 
and opinions of authors expressed herein do not 
necessarily state or reflect those of the U.S. 
Government or any agency thereof. 
